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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the integration of the Ethiopian grain market to the world market; and 
within country grain markets integration. To this end, two cereal crop markets: wheat and 
maize, have been investigated. For maize the integration into the world market is analyzed 
using the US and SAFEX exchange markets as a world market; for wheat Paris and Chicago 
exchange markets are considered a wheat world market. The analysis has been conducted 
using a cointegration method: Johansen (1988) procedure. The results show that the 
Ethiopian grain market is integrated into the world market, albeit to the once geographically 
proximate to it. And further, we found that the elasticity of the price pass through between the 
world and domestic markets has appeared to be more than unitary when evaluated at the 
mean prices of the two food crops.  
The analysis of domestic market integration is conducted using principal component analysis 
(PCA). The result shows that both wheat and maize markets are fairly integrated. However, 
the results demonstrate that in wheat market, of the traditionally known deficit markets 
Mekelle has shown an improvement in integration as its mean prices and price variability 
appear to be in line with the central market, but the maize market result has preserved the 
deficit market status. In the other deficit market, Dire Dawa, the mean prices of wheat and 
maize appear to be higher and more volatile than the central market. The other most striking 
result is that despite huge infrastructural improvement markets further from the central 
market exhibit higher level of price volatility than markets within a 300km distance from the 
central market, Addis Ababa. It has also been observed that the price differential between the 
central market and other local markets has shown a declining trend over time, and found to be 
stationary. This implies that the markets are more likely to converge in the long run, provided 
the market infrastructure continues to develop so as to reduce market information asymmetry 
that we believe has contributed to differences in  price differentials and price volatility across 
markets    
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1. Background 
 
Global food prices increased sharply in recent years. However, there is no consensus on 
whether the recent global food price volatilities are new phenomenon. Gilbert and Morgan 
(2010) argue that the increased volatility of recent years is lower than it was three decades 
ago. Be that as it may, the increased food prices of recent years posed significant policy 
challenges for developing countries where households spend a larger share of their income on 
food. The world has witnessed large fluctuations in food prices which is attributable to many 
factors. The increasing risk and uncertainty that volatility poses in production and investment 
decisions would have substantial implications for the food insecure and/or the poor in 
developing countries. However, it has been observed that global food price volatility would 
also have an impact on those who spend a fraction of their income on food.  
Thus, understanding the food price dynamics and its volatility is essential in designing policy 
responses. Transmission of food price shocks to domestic markets depends on the importance 
of the commodity in the country`s food staple, food status of the country, domestic factors, 
and policies. These factors confounding in many different ways limit the pass through of 
global food price inflation to domestic markets.  
The evidence on the degree of world price transmission to domestic markets has been mixed.  
Hazel et al (1990), using data from 22 developing countries over the 1961-87 period, found 
that while the variability in world prices has been almost entirely transmitted to developing 
countries in the dollar value of their export unit values, it has not been fully transmitted to 
average producer prices, thus concluding that in addition to trade restrictions, exchange rate 
misalignments or domestic distortions have been responsible for the discrepancy between 
domestic and world prices. Dawe (2008) has also shown that exchange rate appreciation has 
insulated complete price pass through in Asian countries. He used data spanning from 2003 
to 2007 and examined the extent to which increases in international cereal prices have been 
transmitted to domestic prices in Asian countries. His findings concluded that the 
international food price transmission was generally incomplete in the Asian countries owing 
to the real appreciation of their currencies against the US dollar during the sample period  
which neutralized a considerable portion of the global price increases when these cereals 
were imported into domestic markets. 
Mudlak and Larson (1992) in a study covering 58 countries for the 1968-78 period concluded 
that most of the variation in world prices is transmitted and that they constitute the dominant 
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component in the variation of domestic prices. Quiroz and Soto (1993), on the other hand, 
using a sample for 60 countries during 1966-91, concluded that in an overwhelming majority 
of cases, transmission of international price signals in agriculture is either very low or  non 
existent. Morriset (1998) examined the gap between domestic and world prices  for major 
markets for industrial countries during 1975-94 and found that while upward movement in 
world prices were clearly passed through in domestic prices, downward movements were not.  
It has also been shown that considerable differences exist between advanced and emerging 
countries. The findings indicate that the pass-through tends to be larger in emerging and 
developing countries (IMF, 2011). Conforti (2004) has shown that price pass through has 
been different in developing countries, for instance, incomplete in African countries, 
relatively more complete among Asian countries, and more mixed in Latin America.  
The price pass through has also been indicated to be heterogeneous across commodity types. 
Dawe (2008) shows rice has a weaker pass through in developing Asia compared to wheat.  
Local policies on specific agricultural commodities, particularly rice from these Asian 
countries, seemed to have further stabilized  and shielded domestic prices from the change in 
world prices. Having investigated the transmission of global price shocks to domestic prices 
in 11 sub-Saharan Africa countries for eight food items during 2007-2008, Minot (2011) 
finds that there is  a transmission of global food prices to domestic prices  for rice and (to a 
lesser extent) maize. By studying the price transmission of global agricultural commodities  
to domestic food prices in India and the People`s Republic of China (PRC), Imai et al (2008) 
also finds that domestic prices for wheat, maize and rice tend to adjust faster to the 
international prices than those of fruits and vegetables.  
In general, various studies pointed the importance of domestic factors and policies in limiting 
the pass-through of food prices. The factors and possible limiting policy regimes highlighted 
include exchange rate movements, transaction costs, and subsidies for agricultural 
commodities among others (Quroz and Soto, 1995; Rapsomanikis et al., 2004; Timmer, 2008; 
Baffes and Gardner, 2003; Imai et al., 2008; Keats et al., 2010; Ianchovichina, et al., 2012; 
IMF, 2011).  
In addition to the above studies, some studies particularly dealt with African countries and 
examined price pass through from world to domestic markets and also within price ass 
through among local markets in a country. For instance, Abdulai (2000) for Ghana, Rashid 
(2004) for Uganda, Lutz Kuiper and Van Tilburg (2006) for Benin, Negassa and Myers 
(2007) for Ethiopia, Van Campenhout (2007) for Tanzania. Myers (2008) for Malawi, Moser, 
Barret, and Minten (2009) for Madagascar, Rashid (2011) for Ethiopia.  
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This study particularly seeks to address two issues. Firstly, it investigates whether the 
domestic grain market prices read the international grain market prices. Secondly, it examines 
the within country integration of grain markets located in different regions across the country. 
To answer the first question, unlike previous studies that use US prices as the world price for 
both wheat and maize, we use two exchange market prices for each commodity against which 
we analyze the integration of Ethiopian grain market to the world market. That is, we use US 
maize and SAFEX maize prices as two world prices against which we examine the 
relationship of the Ethiopian maize market price; and for wheat, we use Paris milling wheat 
price and Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) soft wheat price to investigate the relationship of 
the Ethiopian wheat market to these exchange markets. The national prices for both food 
items considered here are computed as an average of 11 and 10 local markets of wheat and 
maize, respectively.  
The integration of these domestic markets is also analyzed. With regard to domestic market 
integration, previous studies use similar methods explained above. However, except Gilbert 
(2011) we have not seen studies that use principal component analysis to investigate the 
pattern of market integration in the form of the average prices that the different local markets 
have and the magnitude of variability exhibited across markets. In this study, we use principal 
component analysis on the price series that are found to be I (1) to demonstrate the long run 
characteristic of the markets. And further, we employ the principal component analysis of the 
monthly price changes which are found to be I (0), stationary, to explain the short run level of 
market integration.    
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows: Section 2 data source and 
methodology used for the analysis of world to domestic market price pass through; section 3 
results and discussion of world to domestic price pass through; section 4 intra-regional 
market integration; and section 5 concludes. 
 
 
 2. Data Source and Methodology 
 
The data used for the analysis is obtained from various sources. The time series monthly price 
data of maize and wheat for 10 to 12 local markets are obtained from the Ethiopian Grain 
Trade Enterprise (EGTE) for the period from July 2001 to December 2011. The national 
prices of the two food crops considered here are computed from the price data of local 
markets. The descriptive statistics of the domestic prices are given in section (5.4.1). 
4 
 
The corresponding international market prices for maize and wheat are taken from the 
historical data of Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSEX), Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), 
Paris Matif and the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. The descriptive statistics 
of national and international market prices are discussed below.  
 
Figure 1 indicates that the Ethiopian maize prices were in tandem with the international price 
movements up until the beginning of 2008. However,  the nominal maize prices rose sharply 
and exceeded all the international market prices between January 2008 and August 2010. 
Since August 2010 national prices, though rose up gradually, remained well below the US 
and the SAFEX maize prices.  
When we examine the quarterly changes of maize prices (not reported here), we observe that 
national prices in the second quarter of 2002 have sharply increased up until the last quarter 
of 2003. The price increases had been occurring despite the decreasing trends in the 
international maize market. Mainly because, in 2002 meher rain did not come on time and 
hence grain prices went up following  the drought that occurred in 2002/2003. Again since 
the first quarter of 2008 national maize price increased consistently and registered the highest 
increase in the second quarter of 2008, showing an increase of about 60 percent of the already 
high prices experienced at the end of 2007.  The price levels in the last quarter of 2011 have 
remained well above the last quarter of 2007 by as much as 43 percent, 57 percent, and 10 
percent, for national, US Gulf port , and SAFEX maize, respectively.   
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With regard to the wheat price, we observe that the national wheat price has been consistently 
above the international market prices. The sharp increase in national prices has followed the 
2007 and 2008 food price hikes, and spiked to an unprecedented level as high as USD 646 
per metric ton. Since then the national price has exceeded the international market prices by 
far up until it converges for a brief period in 2010 and start diverging once again.  
The national price hikes, though they coincide with the international boom and bust of grain 
prices in the world market that occurred in 2007-2008 and later in 2011, could also be 
attributed to the overall macroeconomic performance of the country.  Because the country has 
registered a consecutive double digit growth since 2006, and inflation has also risen to the 
level as high as 64 percent, in July 2008, and in particular the food price inflation peaked at 
92 percent. For this reason, we remove such a bias from the national prices deflating the 
nominal prices by the CPI over the entire period considered in the study. The international 
prices are deflated using the unit value of exports for advanced countries. The unit value of 
exports is used as a deflator since it measures inflation in the international market. We have 
not opted for deflating all prices converted to their dollar equivalent using the CPI of USA (as 
in Minot, 2011), for the consumption basket considered in calculating the CPI for US 
consumers is considerably different from the consumption basket considered in calculating 
the Ethiopian consumers. 
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Table 1. Maize and Wheat Price Changes 2001 to 2011 
  
Percentage change 
 Jul- 2001 to Dec-2011 
Percentage Range 
over the same Period 
Standard Deviation 
of Monthly changes 
  Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real 
Maize 
     
  
US Gulf Ports 184.8% 83.2% 269.4% 165.2% 6.42% 6.04% 
SAFEX White  174.5% 76.6% 250.3% 185.0% 8.86% 8.48% 
Ethiopia 258.8% -23.2% 924.7% 378.6% 9.96% 8.72% 
Wheat 
     
  
CBOT  132.1% 49.32% 278.5% 242.7% 8.86% 8.90% 
Paris 121.8% 42.71% 345.4% 186.9% 7.20% 6.83% 
Ethiopia  207.6% -34.19% 519.7% 170.0% 6.51% 5.54% 
 
Table 1 provides price changes, range, and standard deviation over the entire period 
considered in this study. Maize prices have substantially increased over the entire period both 
in the national and international markets. However, the increase in the national nominal price 
exceeds the increase in international markets  nearly by 40 percent. Despite the huge increase 
in the nominal price, the Ehiopian real maize price dropped by around 23 percent, while the 
Safex and US real maize prices showed an increase of 77 percent and 83 percent, 
respectively. The range measures the extent of the price spike while the change in range 
measures the long run impact. The nominal price range of Ethiopian maize appears to be 
more than three times as large as the world market price range, implying that Ethiopia 
experiences huge price hikes due to local factors such as the high inflation rate, which has 
already been in a double digit mark before the onset of the crisis and later reached the 
unprecedentedly high level, confounded with the global food crisis that occurred between 
2005 and 2008, and later in 2011. 
Maize price variability in Ethiopia has not been much different from the world market price 
variability. Both nominal and real prices considered, price variability in Ethiopia is closer to 
the Safex price variability than the US gulf port maize price.  
Nominal wheat prices have also increased over time in all markets. The increase in domestic 
nominal price appeared to be twice as large as the increase in the nominal world market 
prices.  As has been the case for Maize, real wheat prices increased in he international market 
by 49 percent for CBOT and 43 percent for Paris milling wheat, while the Ethiopian real 
wheat price dropped by 34 percent.  
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The nominal price hikes appear to be higher both at the international and national markets; 
however, the nominal price of the Ethiopian wheat has shown a change in the price range that 
is  87 percent and 50 percent higher than CBOT and Paris, respectively. This implies that in 
nominal terms the domestic price spikes in wheat market are higher when compared to the 
price hikes in the international market. Nonetheless, the price spikes in the domestic wheat 
market appear to be lower than that of the maize market. This is because the price 
stabilization interventions of the government largely focus on wheat than maize. The 
government has imported wheat and supplied at a subsidized price which is below the market 
price by about 50 percent.    
The price variability provided by the monthly changes shows that both nominal real prices 
are less variable in domestic market than the international markets indicating that the price 
stabilization interventions have effectively insulated the wheat market from the international 
market fluctuations.  
2.1. Methodology 
 
The study of price transmission for homogeneous commodities in space, or for a product as it 
is transformed along the stages of the marketing chain has attracted the interests of 
agricultural economists for many decades.  
Fackler and Goodwin (2001) provides a review of methods and empirical studies of price 
transmission and indicate that at the beginning empirical studies of price transmission used 
simple regression and correlation analyses (Isard, 1977; Monke and Petzel, 1984; Mudlak and 
Larson, 1992; Gardner and Brooks, 1994) that did not account for the dynamics and lead/lag 
relationships in price data. Throughout the 1980s these methods were replaced by dynamic 
regression models that incorporated lagged prices (Ravallion, 1986; Timmer, 1987) and 
studies based on the concept of Granger Causality (Mendoza and Rosegrant, 1995). 
Simple correlation and regression analyses have been found implausible as they result in 
spurious results. This is because with the non-stationary nature of price data using simple 
regression and correlation violates the basic assumptions that an unbiased regression analysis 
must conform to. The fundamental theses in the co-integration approach, thus, cautions that  
before undertaking  a regression analysis one must test whether the non-stationary price data 
are not only correlated with one another but are co-integrated.  If two non-stationary price 
series are co-integrated, it means that there exists a linear combination of the non- stationary 
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series that is stationary and that the series share a common form of non-stationarity, and 
hence cannot drift apart indefinitely.  
After Ardeni`s (1989) paper on price transmission on agricultural markets, the entire 
literature, except the few that use parity  bounds  model, literature on price transmission uses 
cointegration methods. In this study we use the Johansen (1988) method as it provides an 
efficient estimate of the cointegrating vectors (β) and adjustment parameters (α). The 
Johansen procedure is advantageous over the traditional techniques such as like Engle and 
Granger (1987), Engle and Yoo (1991),  in the following  points (Gilbert, 2011): 
i) It enables one to determine the number of existing cointegrating relationships among the 
variables based on the data; 
ii) It distinguishes short run adjustment parameters from long-run (equilibrium) outcomes; 
iii) It doesn`t restrict the equilibrium outcome to be unity 
iv) It provides a possibility of symmetrical adjustment of national to world prices using 
reverse pass-through from former to the later.  
Thus due to these merits, we use the Johansen procedure to identify whether the Ethiopian 
maize and wheat markets are integrated into the world market. Before proceeding with the 
test for cointegration we investigate the time series properties  of the price series to verify that 
the price variables are non-stationary with the same order, I (1).  The non-stationarity of the 
price series is detected using Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) method (Dickey and Fuller, 
1981)
2
. The ADF is conducted with and without trend. Table 2  reports the test results.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 The ADF is based on the following regression: 1 1 1( ) ( )t t t t t tx x x lags x x          , where tx  
denotes the price series under consideration. A negative and significantly different from zero value of   
indicates tx  is I(0). 
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Table 2. Time series properties of nominal and real prices of maize and wheat 
    ADF Statistics without Trend ADF Statistics with Trend 
Markets Lag Nominal Real  Nominal Real  
Maize US 3 -1.798 -1.664 -3.407 -2.845 
 
2 -1.440 -1.365 -2.856 -2.478 
 
1 -1.060 -1.138 -2.320 -2.202 
  0 -0.694 -0.9161 -1.864 -1.946 
SAFEX 3 -1.667 -2.623 -2.380 -2.673 
 
2 -1.605 -2.486 -2.285 -2.538 
 
1 -1.651 -2.494 -2.316 -2.546 
  0 -1.104 -1.768 -1.715 -1.833 
MAIZE ETH 3 -2.455 -2.129 -2.689 -2.544 
 
2 -2.871 -2.466 -3.179 -2.877 
 
1 -3.059 -2.319 -3.365 -2.738 
  0 -1.732 -1.451 -1.687 -1.958 
WHEAT ETH 3 -2.149 -1.216 -2.711 -1.931 
 
2 -2.224 -1.194 -2.776 -1.933 
 
1 -1.975 -1.09 -2.405 -1.862 
  0 -1.441 -0.7884 -1.548 -1.651 
PARIS 3 -1.959 -2.178 -2.375 -2.369 
 
2 -1.572 -1.731 -1.782 -1.839 
 
1 -1.802 -2.034 -2.112 -2.189 
  0 -1.281 -1.341 -1.315 -1.365 
CBOT 3 -1.977 -2.563 -2.652 -2.888 
 
2 -2.004 -2.604 -2.653 -2.912 
 
1 -2.106 -2.704 -2.757 -3.003 
  0 -1.593 -2.096 -2.021 -2.29 
* The Critical value of the ADF test  without trend  and with trend at 5% is -2.89 and -3.45, respectively. 
The results show that all prices non-stationary both in their nominal and real forms.  
After identifying that the price series are non-stationary, I (1),  we run a cointegration 
test to learn that whether a linear combination of any two or three non stationary price 
series for each commodities exist. If it exists, the prices are said to be cointegrated and are 
likely that the two price series share common forms of non-stationarity implying that the pair 
cannot drift apart indefinitely.  We used the Johansen procedure due to the merits mentioned 
above  and the results are reported in table 3. 
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Table 3. Statistical Properties of  Wheat and Maize Price Series, July 2001 to December 2011 
 
 
Trace Statistics of Cointegrated rank 
Implied # of 
Cointegrating 
Vectors 
 
r=0 r≤1 r≤2   
Wheat         
CBOT &Paris 
12.77 
(0.124) 
4.56 
(0.033) 
 
1 
CBOT&Ethiopia 
7.18 
(0.563) 
1.07 
(0.302) 
 
No 
Paris &Ethiopia 
12.48 
(0.136) 
4.02 
(0.045) 
 
1 
CBOT, Paris, &Ethiopia 
24.0 
(0.026) 
12.47 
(0.137) 
3.21 
(0.073) 2* 
Maize         
US &SAFEX 
10.98 
(0.217) 
1.13 
(0.288) 
 
No 
US&Ethiopia 
13.26 
(0.105) 
0.379 
(0.538) 
 
No 
SAFEX & Ethiopia 
14.22 
(0.076) 
4.62 
(0.032) 
 
1 
US, SAFEX, & Ethiopia 
25.64 
(0.144) 
10.66 
(0.237) 
0.691 
(0.406) No 
*Cointegration is tested using Johansen procedure. The reported statistics are test of 
`( ) r  , ( 0,1,2)r  . Tail probabilities are provided in "(..)" parentheses. 
 
A bivariate cointegration test is conducted for the two exchange prices, US and SAFEX,  for 
maize; and Chicago and Paris for wheat. We also conducted a bivariate cointegration test of 
the exchange prices with the domestic prices (US Maize price with Ethiopian Maize, SAFEX 
maize with Ethiopian Maize; and similar combinations of Wheat Exchange prices with 
Domestic price). The result provided in Table 3 shows that the two wheat world prices 
(exchange prices) are cointegrated with one cointegrating vector; Chicago and Ethiopian not 
cointegrated; and Paris and Ethiopian with one cointegrating vector. The trivariate 
cointegration test for wheat prices implied cointegration among the world and domestic 
prices with two cointegrating vectors at a significance level of 10 percent?.  
Unlike the wheat market, the exchange prices of maize, US and SAFEX,  have shown no sign 
of cointegration. This result is contrary to Gilbert (2011). The difference between our result 
and Gilbert (2011) might be due to the difference in the sample period considered, as he 
tested cointegration for a period from January 2005 to December 2009 while in this study we 
considered an extended period that ranges from July 2001 to December 2011.  
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The cointegration test between US and Ethiopian maize prices has also shown no 
cointegration; but SAFEX and Ethiopian maize prices appear to be cointegrated. We failed to 
identify any form of cointegration among the three maize prices in trivariate VAR (3) setting.  
3. World Market Price Transmission to Domestic Market 
 
The results of the cointegration test of the Paris and Chicago wheat prices in a bivariate VAR 
(2) setting signify that the two markets are cointegrated. That is, we reject the no 
cointegration hypothesis, but failed to reject the hypothesis `( ) 1  (see table 3), implying 
that there is one cointegrating vector. The estimated coefficients of the cointegrating vector 
are 
ˆ 0.0036
ˆ 0.0113
paris
chicago


   
   
  
 with standard errors
0.0038
0.0041
 
 
 
. The coefficient for Paris is not 
significantly different from zero; however, the coefficient for  Chicago is three times higher  
than that  of the Paris reaction coefficient and statistically significant implying that Chicago 
reacts to the price developments in Paris market. This may indicate that Chicago plays a 
leadership role in the wheat market. Normalizing the cointegrating vector, we fail to reject the 
hypothesis that this is a unit cointegrating vector ( 2 2.62  with p-value=11%) implying 
that in the long term the two exchange prices move together. The  -matrix of the unit 
cointegrating vector  is given as follows: 
ˆ 0.0344
ˆ 0.0184
Paris
Chicago


   
   
  
 with standard errors 
0.0157
0.0173
 
 
 
.  
In the case where a unit pass through is assumed Paris appears to react more to the changes in 
Chicago prices than that Chicago does to  changes in a Paris price, and the reaction of Paris is 
nearly twice as large as that of Chicago and it is statistically significant.  
In a bivariate setting we test the Chicago and Ethiopian wheat market cointegration and we 
have found that Chicago and Ethiopian Wheat markets are not cointegrated.  
The cointegration test in a bivariate VAR(2)  setting for Paris and Ethiopian wheat markets 
shows that the two markets are cointegrated. That is, we fail to reject the hypothesis that 
`( ) 1  indicating that there is one cointegrating vector (See table 3).  
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The estimated coefficients of the cointegrating vector with no restrictions imposed are 
provided as follows: 
1
0.027

 
  
 
,  
ˆ 0.049
ˆ 0.035
Paris
Eth


   
   
  
 with standard errors 
0.021
0.081
 
 
 
.  The estimated 
coefficients indicate that the reaction of Paris to changes in the Ethiopian wheat market is 
greater than the reaction of the Ethiopian market to developments in Paris, and it is 
statistically significant.  
We then imposed a unit pass through restriction and tested for its validity. The likelihood 
ratio test failed to reject the restriction that the cointegrating vector is a unit cointegrating 
vector ( 2(1) 1.4  , with p-value=24%).  The corresponding     and  matrix is  
1
1

 
  
 
, 
ˆ 0.04
ˆ 0.01
Paris
Eth


   
   
  
 with standard errors 
0.015
0.014
 
 
 
. The reaction from the Paris 
exchange market to disequilibrium is 4 times as large as the reaction from the Ethiopian 
market and  implying that errors are corrected rapidly in Paris market than Ethiopia, and the 
coefficient is statistically significant. Subsequently, we tested whether the two markets 
individually react to the disequilibrium (weak exogeneity). Firstly, we assumed that the 
Ethiopian market does not react to changes in the Paris exchange prices, i.e., 0Eth  . 
Secondly, we suppose the Paris exchange market does not react to the changes in the 
Ethiopian domestic wheat prices, 0Paris  . We failed to reject the restriction that the 
Ethiopian wheat market does not react to the changes in Paris exchange prices ( 2(1) 2  , with 
p-value=16%).  
ˆ 0.047
ˆ 0.000
Paris
Eth


   
   
  
with standard errors 
0.018
0.000
 
 
 
 
However, we reject the hypothesis that Paris exchange prices don`t react to changes in 
Ethiopia wheat prices (
2
(1) 3  , with p-value=8%).  
ˆ 0.000
ˆ 0.031
Paris
Eth


   
   
  
 with standard errors 
0.000
0.013
 
 
 
.   
The weak exogeneity restrictions applied together with the unit pass through assumption also 
produce an identical relationship with the above results.  
2
(2) 8.3  , 
ˆ 0.04
ˆ 0.00
Paris
Eth


   
   
  
with standard errors 
0.015
0.000
 
 
 
,  LR test: 
2
(2) 2  , p-value=36% 
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ˆ 0.000
ˆ 0.006
Paris
Eth


   
   
  
with standard errors 
0.000
0.013
 
 
 
, LR test: 2(2) 8.3  , p-value=1.5% 
The implications of the weak exogeneity test are that the Ethiopian wheat market does not 
react to changes in the prices of Paris milling wheat whereas the Paris milling wheat prices 
react to changes in the Ethiopian wheat market. This seems to be against the conventional " 
small country" assumption that would characterize the Ethiopian wheat market in an 
international context. However, we could argue that the contrary results can be attributed to 
two possible reasons. Firstly, when we look at the trend of wheat import to Ethiopia, we see 
that the wheat import has shown a significant growth in the period between 2001 to 2011 than 
between 1991 to 2000, 10 percent and 17 percent, respectively. The average annual import 
has been 688 thousand and 662 thousand metric tonnes per annum during the two periods, 
respectively, showing a 4 percent difference between the periods on per annum average 
import and a 14 percent increase in the total amount of wheat imported
3
.  
The involvement of private traders on wheat import business is virtually nil, despite the 
liberalization measures adopted by the incumbent government after its coming into power in 
1991. As a result, the import of wheat apart from wheat imported in the form of food aid has 
been entirely procured by the Ethiopian government. Government procurement deals over the 
years have shown that almost all the purchases have been made from suppliers in Europe and 
supplied at the Black sea port. Since the Ethiopian government announces wheat procurement 
bids based on local developments such as production and supply to the local market, it is 
reasonable to think that international suppliers who aim at taking part in the procurement bids 
may closely observe developments in the domestic market and foresee potential purchases 
that would be made by the Ethiopian government, whether it is panic or planned purchase. 
Hence, international wheat suppliers may reflect such signals from local developments in the 
exchange markets. Further, we can argue that based on drought situations and local 
emergency food requirements donor agencies and/or countries appear in the exchange 
markets or make purchases from international suppliers who are believed to be market 
players in the exchange market. Both purchase needs to occur either together or separately 
                                                 
3
 The result calculated from FAOSTAT wheat import data provides slightly different results. It shows on 
average Ethiopia has imported 0.5 million meteric tonnes of wheat between the years 1993-2000 and more than 
double of this figure (1.03 million metric tonnes) between the years 2001-2010. The share of the total quantity 
imported is 4 percent out o the total imported to Africa, and 28 percent out of the total imported to East Africa 
between the years 2001-2010 (Here East Africa according FAO`s regional mapping constituted 19 countries). 
The result, however, does show no significant difference when the share is computed considering Burundi, 
Djbouti, Eriteria, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania as an East African group. The share only jumped to 29 
percent.  
14 
 
may imply that developments in local wheat market situations are likely to be read by 
international wheat suppliers and hence we hardly rule out the possibility that Ethiopian 
wheat market situations could indirectly influence exchange market prices. 
On the contrary, the second reason dwells upon explaining the absence of reaction from the 
side of local markets to international wheat market developments. Lack of market 
information infrastructure  and system is one of the culprits that immediately come to one`s 
mind in an effort to justify why Ethiopian markets are isolated from international markets. 
However, it is crystal clear that Ethiopia is a net importer of wheat and other grains and the 
local marketable surplus out of total production is not more than 30 percent. Therefore, it is 
counter intuitive to anticipate a supply response from the Ethiopian wheat market to 
international market price developments, even with the assumption of complete access for 
international market information.  
Besides this, even if they understand that the import parity prices is below domestic prices 
implying the profitability of importing wheat and selling at the domestic market, local traders 
cannot import and sale wheat on the domestic market due to several problems that include 
lack of access for foreign exchange; however, there is no legal restriction put in place 
preventing importing wheat.  As a result, local traders merely closely watch the actions of the 
government, for it either uses its stock reserve or import and sale at a subsidized price with an 
objective of local price stabilization.  This compels local traders to focus on domestic 
developments per se than keep abreast of international market developments. And further, we 
argue that the introduction of local food aid purchase scheme since 1996
4
 may have changed 
the price formation in the Ethiopian grain market. Local food aid purchase between 1996 and 
2004 has accounted for on average nearly 12 percent of the total marketed surplus of cereals,  
which ranges from 28 to 30 percent Walker and Wandschneider (2005). Therefore, it is 
reasonable to believe that such local food aid purchases by different aid and humanitarian 
agencies including WFP, EURONAID, GTZ, Save the Children, and other agencies working 
in the humanitarian aid program possibly influence local price levels and draw the attention 
                                                 
4
 In 1996, in response to Government appeals to donors, the European Commission initiated a local procurement 
program. In subsequent years a more widespread program has been introduced with the following objectives: a) 
to procure food aid locally/ regionally as part of a more general policy support linking  food aid with market 
development; b) to improve food aid targeting through diversifying  grain types; c) to support domestic prices 
during years of good harvest in order to provide production incentives to farmers; d) to encourage entry and 
expansion of the domestic grain trade by familiarizing farmers with more  formal contract arrangements  and 
help food aid activities into the broader domestic grain marketing. However, Walker ad Wandschneider (2005) 
question the contribution of the procurement scheme with regard to its objective of helping the development of 
agricultural markets to be more formal.   
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of local traders to follow their actions and procurement needs than adhering to the 
developments of the international market for which they are incapable to react
5
.  
Next we add the Ethiopian prices to the world market prices and test for cointegration in 
trivariate setting VAR (3). The result shows that there are two cointegrating vectors, 
`( ) 2  , at the 10 percent level of significance. As explained above the integration of the 
Ethiopian market is established indirectly in contrast to its limited openness to the world 
market. 
 From the study of the Paris and Chicago wheat prices we have seen that they are 
cointegrated with a unit cointegrating vector,  and hence we can proceed with the restriction 
that  
1
1
1
0

 
 
  
 
 
 and we further consider that the two markets will have an equal effect on the 
Ethiopian wheat market, we restrict
1
2
1
2 2
1

 
 
  
  
, here Chicago is allowed to have an equal 
impact as that of Paris prices on the Ethiopian market. However, as we have indicated above 
the bivariate cointegration test of Chicago and Ethiopian wheat market indicated the two 
markets are not cointegrated. For this reason, we relax the equal impact assumption in a 
subsequent discussion.  
We further impose a "small country" assumptions on the  -matrix showing that Ethiopia 
may not affect the world market prices in both exchange markets. That is, we restrict 21 0   
and 22 0   hypothesizing that the Ethiopian price does not impact the Paris and Chicago 
wheat exchange prices.  The estimated  -matrix is  
ˆ 0.037 0.000
ˆ 0.016 0.000
ˆ 0.000 0.005
Paris
Chicago
Ethiopia



   
   
   
  
  
with standard errors
0.016 0.000
0.018 0.000
0.000 0.017
 
 
 
 
 
. However, the log 
likelihood ratio test rejected the restrictions (
2
(5) 14.87  with p-value=1%). Though we 
observe that Paris reacts more than Chicago to deviations from equilibrium, we reject the 
hypothesis that the two markets are independent of one another. The result in here confirms 
                                                 
5
 Over the years between 1996 and 2004 locally procured food aid (proxied by local purchases of cereals for 
food aid purpose) accounted for 25 percent of total relief food aid imported.   
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our result that we established in a bivariate cointegration test of the Ethiopian and Paris prices 
as we rejected the hypothesis that exchange markets do not react to the developments in the 
Ethiopian wheat market.  
For the maize market we analyze US maize price, SAFEX white maize spot price and 
Ethiopian maize price. First we check the cointegration of the two exchange markets: US and 
SAFEX. The bivariate cointegration VAR (2) shows that the two markets are not 
cointegrated, as we fail to reject `( ) 0   (see table 2).  
We also conducted a bivariate cointegration test on each of the two exchange prices with the 
Ethiopian maize prices. The results show that the US maize price is not cointegrated with the  
Ethiopian price whereas SAFEX price does. Thus in the following we look in detail the 
cointegration relation between the SAFEX and the Ethiopian maize prices. As we can see 
from the table (2), that the two markets are cointegrated with one cointegrating vector, 
  1   providing a one dimensional space where the cointegrating vector is positioned. 
The coefficients estimated with no restriction are as follows: 
ˆ 0.065
ˆ 0.023
Safex
Eth


   
   
  
with standard errors
0.023
0.021
 
 
 
. The SAFEX coefficient is significantly 
different from zero implying that only SAFEX reacts to changes in price disequilibrium, and 
the coefficient of the SAFEX is  three times as large as the Ethiopian.  
We have also tested whether the cointegrating vector is a unit cointegrating vector, but we 
reject the unit cointegrating vector hypothesis ( 2(1) 4.8  , with p-value=3%) implying that in 
the long run the prices are not likely to read one another.   
Next we investigated the weak exogeneity assumption imposed on the two markets. First, we 
employ the weak exogeneity test on both prices leaving the adjustment coefficients 
unrestricted.  We first impose 1 0  , assuming that changes in SAFEX price does not 
depend on the price difference between SAFEX and the Ethiopian price. We failed to reject 
the hypothesis (
2
(1) 2.15  with p-value=14%) implying that SAFEX prices do not rely on the 
lagged difference between Ethiopian and SAFEX prices. In other words, much of the 
information that cause changes in the SAFEX prices emanate from its own previous year 
prices, and hence SAFEX tends to become an autoregressive series. We further added a 
restriction that SAFEX does not react to any price differences between its own and Ethiopian 
maize prices, i.e, 12 0  , and the hypothesis is weakly rejected (
2
(2) 4.8   with p-value=9%). 
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Nonetheless, we strongly reject the hypothesis ( 2(2) 4.3  , with p-value=4%) when we leave 
out the restriction ( 1 0  ) and test the restriction on  separately. Thus we could confirm 
that SAFEX prices  react to Ethiopian market prices when cointegration is any other than 
unitary.  
Now we investigated the reaction of the Ethiopian maize market to the price differences 
between itself and SAFEX prices. The unit cointegrating vector hypothesis is rejected above. 
So let us suppose that 2 0  , implying the Ethiopian maize price changes does not carry any 
information from the price differences between itself and SAFEX prices. The test on the 
restriction is rejected ( 2(1) 3.34  with p-value=7%) implying that in the long term there is a 
possibility that the two prices relate and changes in Ethiopian maize market price consider the 
discrepancy between it and the SAFEX prices. Further, we impose the restriction that 
Ethiopian prices don`t react to changes in SAFEX prices, 12 0  . The result is that, we 
failed to reject the hypothesis ( 2(2) 4.3  with p-value=12%) implying that the Ethiopian 
market does react to price differences between itself and the SAFEX maize prices. This 
hypothesis ( 12 0  ) is also rejected when we leave out the restriction on the cointegrating 
vector ( 2(1) 0.66  with p-value=42%) implying that the Ethiopian market does respond to the 
developments in SAFEX maize prices.  The  coefficients and their standard errors for 
restrictions discussed above are given as follows : 
1. For restrictions on the Ethiopian market 
2 0  , 
ˆ 0.08
ˆ 0.03
Safex
Eth


   
   
  
 with standard errors 
0.035
0.032
 
 
 
 
2 0  ,  2 0  , 
ˆ 0.08
ˆ 0.00
Safex
Eth


   
   
  
with standard errors 
0.035
0.000
 
 
 
 
 -no restriction,  2 0  , 
ˆ 0.094
ˆ 0.000
Safex
Eth


   
   
  
 with standard errors 
0.03
0.00
 
 
 
 
2. For restrictions on SAFEX  
1 0  , 
ˆ 0.065
ˆ 0.075
Safex
Eth


   
   
  
 with standard errors 
0.041
0.036
 
 
 
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1 0  , 1 0  , 
ˆ 0.000
ˆ 0.078
Safex
Eth


   
   
  
 with standard errors 
0.000
0.035
 
 
 
 
 -no restriction,  1 0  , 
ˆ 0.000
ˆ 0.035
Safex
Eth


   
   
  
 with standard errors 
0.000
0.015
 
 
 
 
Adding the Ethiopian maize price to the cointegration test, we obtain no cointegration among 
the prices in trivariate VAR (3) setting  (see table 2).  
 
Summary of  the Results 
 
In this part we examined whether the Ethiopian wheat and maize markets are integrated into 
the world market. To this end, we investigated cointegration relations between the Ethiopian 
wheat market and two exchange wheat markets (Chicago and Paris); and the Ethiopian maize 
market and two exchange maize markets (US and SAFEX).  
We summarize the main results that emerge from the analysis as follows: 
 We found out that the Ethiopian wheat market is integrated into the world market as 
implied by its cointegration  with the Paris wheat market; albeit this cointegration 
could not be directly evidenced by the reaction of the Ethiopian market to 
developments in Paris wheat market.  
 Chicago exchange and Ethiopian wheat market have shown no cointegration. This 
may imply that the geographical proximity of Paris to Ethiopia than Chicago may 
have influenced the relation of the two markets. As provided in the discussion, 
Ethiopia imports most of its wheat from the Black sea and Mediterranean ports, thus, 
Ethiopia may prefer to look at Paris prices than Chicago. 
 With regard to maize, the Ethiopian maize market is found to be integrated into the 
world market. As it is the case of wheat, geographically the nearest exchange market 
(SAFEX) appeared to be cointegrated with the Ethiopian maize market. While the US 
maize market does show no cointegration.  
 Exchange markets in the case of wheat, Paris and Chicago, appear to be cointegrated 
while maize exchange markets, US and SAFEX, found to be not cointegrated.      
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4. Intra-Regional Food Market Analysis 
 4.1. Evolution of Cereal Marketing Policy 
 
Since the Imperial regime cereal marketing policy has been put in place. The policies that 
have been adopted during the last three regimes, including the incumbent, fundamentally 
tailored to their ideological inclination.  
During the Imperial regime, cereal markets were characterized by a high share of marketable 
surplus out of the total production, and very high transport costs due mainly to the minimal 
road networks and telecommunication services. The marketed surplus, which is indicated to 
be around 25-30 percent of the total production, however, is hardly a result of increased 
productivity. But it was sourced from the in kind rent and revenue paid by the renters to the 
church and the state. Government intervention during this period was through the Ethiopian 
Grain Board (EGB) established in 1950, later reformed and renamed the Ethiopian Grain 
Council (EGC) in 1960. Initially, the EGB was mandated to export licensing for oilseeds and 
pulses, quality control,  supervision of marketing intelligence,  and regulation of domestic 
sales.  
The Grain Board reformed and renamed to Ethiopian Grain Council in 1960 as the Grain 
Board failed to achieve its objectives. The Grain Council was provided new roles and 
mandated to hold stocks, stabilize grain prices in urban areas, and improve the production of 
cereals, oilseeds and pulses for export. Yet again the Grain Council also ended up ineffective 
in achieving the objectives it was established for. Holemberg (1977) indicated that the policy 
interventions through the Grain Council did not contribute to the improvement in market 
integration, because the Grain Council focused its interventions in a limited number of 
production regions and urban areas, while disregarding larger parts of the country.  
The Socialist regime that came to power in 1974, established Agricultural Marketing 
Corporation (AMC) in 1976, with the support from the World Bank. Through the 
corporation, it directly involved in wholesale and retail trade. The corporation was tasked 
with a range of activities which include handling almost all agricultural input and output 
markets. The corporation determines annual quotas that farmers and traders had to supply to 
the corporation at a fixed price which is far below market prices in most areas. It had put 
restrictions on private grain trade and interregional grain trade. As a result of these 
restrictions,   rural incomes depressed; resources had transferred from rural households to a 
small group of urban households through artificially cheap prices; and consequently 
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depressed cereal production in Ethiopia over the years the restrictions were in place(Lirenso, 
1995; Dercon, 1994; Franzel et al., 1989).  
Cognizant of the setbacks that stem from the misguided cereal policy adhered, the Socialist 
government undertook major grain market policy reforms over the years since 1987 due 
mainly to increasing pressure from donors, worsening economic conditions, and political and 
economic policy changes in the great socialist blocks such as the USSR, and Eastern Europe. 
Hence as of March 1990, quota requirements abolished and movement restrictions lifted. 
Private traders were allowed to move grain across regions as long as they agreed to sell half 
of their supply to AMC again at a specified price (Franzel et al., 1989). These measures 
eliminated the AMC`s monopoly power and the socialist regime collapsed a year after.  
Following the downfall of the socialist regime, the Agricultural Marketing Corporation has 
bee reorganized as a public enterprise known as the Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise 
(EGTE)The Transitional government instituted policies reorienting the country towards a 
market economy. For this reason, the EGTE allowed to operate in the market and compete 
with the private sector. In line with this, it has been given new roles: to stabilize prices both 
to encourage production and protect consumers from price shocks; to earn foreign exchange 
through grain exports to the world market; and to maintain strategic food reserves for disaster 
response and emergency food security operations.  
The restructured enterprise has reduced grain marketing networks, fewer purchase and sales 
centres than the AMC.  These factors juxtaposed to shortage of working capital that the 
EGTE encountered and under utilization of available resources made the enterprise fell short 
of expectations, especially in price stabilization (Lirenso, 1994).  
In later years, an attempt has been made through a series of proclamations and regulations 
which gradually withdraw the EGTE from the price stabilization role and redirect its efforts 
towards export promotion, facilitating emergency food security reserves, and helping national 
disaster prevention and preparedness programs.  
In the face of a series of regulations which require the EGTE to concentrate on issues other 
than price stabilization, the EGTE has been called on back to its price stabilization roles in 
two occasions. Firstly, following the 2000/1 and 2001/2 bumper produce of grain; secondly, 
to stabilize the food price spikes between 2005 to 2008, because, regardless of consecutive 
years of reported good harvest, prices of major cereals began rising sharply in late 2005 
(Rashid and Lemma, 2010). The challenges that the enterprise has been dealing with were 
diametrically opposite. In the first instance, it was supposed to deal with the decline of maize 
prices by an unprecedented amount as large as 80 percent in early 2002,  that occurred as a 
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result of increased maize productivity. Maize farming, thus, has become highly unprofitable, 
for the ratio of input to the producers` price has climbed from 1.7 in 2000 to about 9.0 in 
2002, leading to a a fall in fertilizer application by about 22 percent in the following crop 
year. The implication of the incident was that the increase in productivity cannot simply 
translate into improvements in farmers` well-being.  
The return to its stabilization role enabled the EGTE to procure 18000 metric tonnes of 
maize, of which it exported 11000 metric tonnes. Unfortunately, the bumper harvest could 
not be extended to the 2002 crop year due to both the delay in the 2002 meher (main growing 
season) rainfall, and decline in the application of modern inputs because of higher input-
output price ratio which made using modern inputs unprofitable. Unsurprisingly, in the next 
year the country has faced a food security crisis which was averted through generous donor 
support and about 1 million metric tonnes of maize imported as food aid.  
The incident of the 2000/1 and 2001/2 has been a showcase in that agricultural policy 
measures that aim to increase productivity and promote technology adoption can be sustained 
only when the marketing infrastructure is developed hand in hand with the improvement in 
productivity. As market infrastructure by itself can not result in desired outcomes, systems 
that aim to bring efficient marketing outcomes need to be put in place. This, in turn, may 
increase the share of the producers` price both in the wholesale and retail prices, and hence 
improve the welfare of the smallholder farmers that contribute more than 90 percent the food 
supply. In the following section, we explore the extent of physical infrastructure and market 
infrastructure development in terms of its impetus to food market integration in the country.  
4.2. Infrastructure Development  
 
The market mechanism works where the necessary and sufficient conditions for its operation 
are satisfied. That is, market functioning towards the desired objectives depends on the 
adequacy of both physical, informational , and institutional infrastructure. In a place where at 
least the physical infrastructure is virtually non-existent, as it was in the 1980s and early 
1990s Ethiopia, there are likely to have been different prices across the country characterized 
by inter-regional price differentials, differing variability, and inefficient price formation. Poor 
infrastructure may also have contributed to the famines that occurred in mid 1980s and 
before. Since in times of drought, it was not possible to transport the surplus produce 
available in an unaffected area to the drought stricken areas due mainly to lack of 
infrastructure connecting the two places. For example, in the 1980s, more than 90 percent of 
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the country's population lived more than a 48 hour walk from a paved road (WFP, 1989); the 
government largely controlled transportation, telecommunication was thin, and mobile phone 
technology was non-existent. Up until 1991, the country had about 4109 kms of asphalt road, 
9298 kms of gravel road, and about 5601kms of rural roads. The construction of  all types of 
roads, especially rural roads, has been given due attention by the new government that came 
into power in 1991. As a result, total road networks increased by 29 percent before 2000. The 
rural road network grew by around 68 percent, gravel roads by around 23 percent, while 
asphalt road network fell by about 10 percent. During the later years, the construction new 
rural and gravel roads, upgrading existing gravel roads to asphalt roads, continued 
consistently. Between the years 2000 and 2011, total road network grew by about 39 percent. 
Of these asphalt roads increased by 6 percent,  gravel roads by 14 percent, and rural roads by 
21 percent showing that due attention has been given to connect rural areas to main all 
weather and asphalt roads thereby reducing the number of hours that someone has to walk to 
reach the main roads connecting towns or cities. The focus provided for the construction of 
rural roads is reasonable on account of the fact that Ethiopia is largely a rural country, where 
more than 80 percent of the population resides.  
  
Information flow plays a significant role in the performance of markets. For this reason, 
increasing means of information flow and hence enhancing access for it is fundamental to 
achieve market efficiency or integration of markets across regions. Telecommunication 
service is one of the means by which market information could be transmitted between 
buyers and sellers, and prices possibly negotiated between trading partners. In the Ethiopian 
context, the virtue of telecommunication service with regard to market information flow has 
not been exploited until recently. For example, in 1991 the penetration rate of fixed lines in 
1991 was 0.27 per 100 individuals, showing that telecommunication services were largely 
inaccessible during the Socialist regime. Mobile telephone service was not available until 
1999.  
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Table 4. Road Network, Telephone Subscription, and Penetration Rate 
Year 
Road Network(km) Telephone Subscription and Penetration Rate 
Gravel Asphalt Rural Total Fixed Line Fixed Line* Mobile Mobile* 
Average 
1993-1999 11.41 3.68 9.40 24.49 153.80 0.26 6.74 0.01 
2000 12.25 3.82 15.48 31.55 231.95 0.35 17.76 0.03 
2001 12.47 3.92 16.48 32.87 283.68 0.42 27.50 0.04 
2002 12.56 4.05 16.68 33.29 353.82 0.51 50.37 0.07 
2003 12.34 4.36 17.15 33.85 404.79 0.57 51.32 0.07 
2004 13.91 4.64 17.96 36.51 484.37 0.67 155.53 0.21 
2005 13.64 4.97 18.41 37.02 610.35 0.82 410.63 0.55 
2006 14.31 5.00 20.16 39.47 725.05 0.95 866.70 1.14 
2007 14.63 5.45 22.35 42.43 880.09 1.13 1208.50 1.55 
2008 14.36 6.07 23.93 44.36 897.29 1.13 1954.53 2.46 
2009 14.23 6.94 25.64 46.81 915.06 1.13 4051.70 4.99 
2010 14.37 7.48 26.94 48.79 908.88 1.10 6854.00 8.26 
2011 13.61 8.82 29.61 52.04 829.01 0.98 14126.66 16.67 
Average  
2000-2011 13.56 5.46 20.90 39.92 627.03 0.81 2481.27 3.01 
Average 
1993-2011 13.39 5.32 20.01 38.73 590.62 0.77 2290.92 2.77 
Average Annual  
Growth (%) 1.59 7.66 11.00 6.69 16.05 12.38 97.10 92.50 
Source: Data on Road Network (1993-2008) is taken from Shahidur and Asfaw (2011), and for the 
years 2009 to 2011 compiled from CSA Statistical Abstracts various years. Data on telephone 
subscription and penetration rate are obtained from UN Data/World Telecommunications/ICT 
database.  
* The penetration rate is calculated by dividing the number of telephone subscriptions by the  
population and multiplying by 100 
 
 
4.3. Analytical Approach 
 
The integration of the domestic food markets is analyzed using a principal component 
analysis (PCA). PCA is fundamentally a dimension reduction technique. It may be used to 
estimate factor structure  on the assumption that factors are uncorrelated and "specific" 
variances (i.e., those of the unexplained components are equal for all items considered.  This 
is an exploratory statistical technique which specifies a linear  factor structure between 
variables, and especially useful when the data under consideration are correlated. If the 
underlying data are un-correlated  PCA will have little utility. In the sense of this paper, PCA 
is used to analyze the integration of regional market prices taking 10 to 12 cereal markets in 
Ethiopia. We consider two crops, maize and wheat.  
The procedure for PCA begins with the raw price data of the above-mentioned cereals on m 
markets for n months. As we need all markets to have equal importance, we calculate the 
eigenvalues and eigenvectors using a correlation matrix. The size of the eigenvalues reflects 
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the percentage of the variance explained by each component.  To calculate the amount that it 
explains, we sum up the value of all of the eigenvalues, and then divide each eigenvalue by 
the sum. Since we do the principal component analysis based on the correlation matrix, 
essentially the eigenvalues on the diagonal will sum up to 1 and hence we would expect any 
major factor would at least be able to generate its share of variance. The eigenvectors, on the 
other hand, are weights (regression coefficients ) attached to each variable in the computation 
of each principal component.   
The first principal component is a linear combination of the original variables  
1 2( , ,......, )nm m m : 
1 11 1 12 2 1........ n nPC m m m       
that varies as much as possible for the individual markets, subject to the condition that the 
weights of the PC coefficient, eigenvectors, add up to one, i.e.,    
11 12 1........ 1n       
Thus the variance of 1PC , 1( )Var PC , is as large as possible, provided the constraint on the 
constants. Likewise, for m -markets we will  have m-principal components, where each 
consecutive component accounts for as much variation in the underlying data as possible, i.e.,   
1 2( ) ( ) ...... ( )mVar PC Var PC Var PC    
Each principal component is uncorrelated with every other component. The lack of the 
correlation means that the indices are measuring different dimensions of the data, and hence 
the above principal component variance ordering, i.e., the eigenvalues of the principal 
components in descending order. The idea in the principal component analysis is that the 
variance of every new variable will be so low that most of the variation in the data will be 
explained by the first few PC variables.  The number of the principal components to be 
retained in the analysis can be determined in two ways. Firstly, based on some theoretical 
knowledge of the subject of the study and desired objectives to be met, only a few of  
principal components that explain the majority of the variation underlying the data can be 
retained. This is done by observing the cumulative percentage explained. Secondly, using the 
time plot of eigenvalues ordered from the largest to the smallest, we examine the scree plot of 
eigenvalues. It helps in visually demonstrating the proportion of total variance each principal 
component accounts for, and that we can throw away the lower principal components without 
losing much explanatory power. That is, we look at for a point on the scree plot where the 
value of the eigenvalue drops dramatically and from that point on the remaining values have 
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nearly about the same size. That turning point will serve as a cut-off  point to consider those 
principal components up till the kink.   
Market integration analysis using PCA differs from the conventional cointegration analysis in 
that cointegration looks for long run relationships between different prices, while PCA, 
applied to price changes looks for short run co-movement between different prices. There can 
be considerable co-movement without cointegration but also cointegration with only limited 
short run co-movement. Applied to price levels PCA is closer to cointegration analysis but 
can give very different  results if one price has much larger trend than another; this can 
dominate the first PCA without explaining much of the other series. For that reason, we 
conduct a PCA analysis on price changes so that we reduce the impact of the market price 
with larger trend, if any, and to demonstrate the short run co-movement of market prices.  
The results from the principal component analysis are corroborated by examining the 
stationarity of the price spreads between the central market, Addis Ababa and other regional 
markets. This is because the stationarity of price spreads can be used to suggest that markets 
are efficient and integrated. The intuition behind the price spread stationarity is that price 
spread stationarity implies a market in which locations are, in the long run, both efficient and 
fully integrated. This means that the market equilibrates in the long run, as arbitrage 
opportunities exploited, and that shocks originating in one location are eventually transmitted 
fully to the other location. However, more contentious is the explanation that would emerge 
from non-stationarity of price spreads. It may imply that markets are in a long run 
disequilibrium situation. More likely it may imply integration is less than complete, either 
because markets are isolated or marginal adjustments occur. Thus, drawing conclusions about 
the extent of integration are difficult to justify using linear dynamic regression  per se, either 
because a switching regime regression (before  and after a certain factors which likely 
improve market integration have been introduced) is more appropriate. In brief, other tests 
such as like cointegration tests of spatial integration are heavily dependent upon assumptions 
which may, in most cases, be quite strong. These assumptions may pertain to transaction 
costs, which are assumed to be stationary or  represented in  an ad hoc simplistic manner.  
For this reason, the investigation of market integration should not simply dwell upon analysis 
of whether prices are integrated. Exploratory results from the analysis of market integration 
based on price data provide an insight of revealed patterns of integration. This opens up an 
agenda for inferential analysis so that we examine what factors possibly impacted the 
observed market integration.  Though we are well aware of the importance of analyzing the 
factors that contributed to the revealed market integration, we have not been able to go 
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beyond uncovering the patterns due mainly to lack of data on market infrastructure tailored to 
the market locations. 
4.4. Results and Discussion  
 
In the following we discuss the results obtained from the principal component analysis.  
4.4.1. Wheat Market 
 
In the analysis of wheat market integration, we use wholesale crop price data obtained from 
the Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise (EGTE) for the period July 2001 to December 2011 
across 11 local markets namely: Addis Ababa, Ambo, Assela, Dire Dawa, Dessie, Gonder, 
Jimma, Mekelle, Nazereth, Robe, and Shashemene. Addis Ababa, the capital city of the 
country, is treated as a central market and all the other market prices compare against the 
central market.  
 
Table 5. Summary Statistics of Nominal and Real Prices of Wheat in 11 Markets 
Markets 
Percentage Change 
July 2001 to December 2007 
Percentage Range Over the 
same period 
Standard Deviations 
of Monthly Changes 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real 
AA 313% -37% 546% 184% 25% 21% 30.69 22.01 1297% 1660% 
Ambo 395% 60% 684% 665% 27% 186% 27.03 16.83 1263% 1871% 
Assela 416% -24% 670% 187% 28% 29% 28.05 19.79 1280% 1598% 
DD 202% -44% 327% 372% 26% 73% 35.87 24.16 1349% 1961% 
Dessie 173% -39% 461% 335% 27% 45% 31.27 22.90 1287% 1753% 
Gonder 320% -39% 524% 476% 28% 136% 32.27 23.08 1386% 2077% 
Jimma 165% -35% 338% 168% 30% 20% 34.91 21.56 1332% 1639% 
Mekelle 309% -5% 530% 240% 23% 30% 30.16 17.11 1281% 1598% 
Nazereth 440% -27% 959% 226% 35% 75% 24.86 20.18 1257% 1691% 
Robe 383% -34% 607% 171% 26% 19% 28.73 21.50 1277% 1636% 
Shash 309% -34% 527% 171% 23% 19% 30.15 21.50 1279% 1636% 
National 308% -34% 520% 168% 23% 19% 30.12 21.47 1269% 1636% 
 
Table 5 provides price changes, percentage range, standard deviation of monthly changes, 
average prices, and standard deviation of the monthly price series over the entire period 
considered in this study.  
The nominal wheat prices have increased substantially in all markets. The increase in most of 
the markets, except Dire Dawa, Dessie, and Jimma, was well above the increase in the 
national price. The real wheat prices have fallen in all the markets over the period July, 2001 
to December, 2011; however, Ambo exceptionally has shown an increase of about 60 
percent. The range measures the the extent of price spikes, while the change in range 
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measures the long run impact. The percentage range in Ambo, Dire Dawa, Dessie, and 
Gonder have been above 300 percent, the largest being in Ambo. These markets have 
experienced a price spike that is 2 to 3 times as large as the price spikes of the rest of the 
markets. The price variability provided by the standard deviation of the monthly changes 
espouses the difference in price fluctuations across markets.  Price variability in Ambo, Dire 
Dawa, Gonder, and Nazereth is more than twice as large as the variability in other markets. 
However, the  average price over the entire period across markets has not shown substantial 
difference. Markets in Ambo and Dire Dawa have shown the smallest and largest average 
price, respectively. This is commensurate with the fact that traditionally Ambo is a surplus 
market and hence it is more likely to have lower average prices than other places whereas 
Dire Dawa is deficit market where prices , unless there exist interventions from the 
government, would be higher than the surplus markets and the central market by a substantial 
amount.  
We conducted the PCA of the 11 wheat markets, and based on the scree plot and cumulative 
variation method, we retained two principal components. Because we found that the first two 
principal components explain more than 90 percent of the variation in the price data of the 11 
markets.  
 
Table 6. PCA Results of Wheat Market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Comp1 Comp2 
AA 0.3139 -0.0573 
Ambo 0.3084 -0.2496 
Assela 0.3090 -0.2436 
DD 0.2852 0.4302 
Dessie 0.3023 0.2017 
Gonder 0.3057 0.0397 
Jimma 0.2492 0.6723 
Mekelle 0.3165 -0.0386 
Nazereth 0.2906 -0.4088 
Robe 0.3126 -0.1605 
Shash 0.3166 -0.0377 
Eigenvalue 9.9264 0.7006 
Proportion 
Explained 0.9024 0.0637 
Cumulative 
Variation  0.9024 0.9661 
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The first principal component assigns nearly equal (positive) weights to all the markets. It, 
therefore, shows that there is a common component to price changes in all markets. We 
demonstrate this by plotting the score values obtained using the weights of the principal 
components and the standardized market prices of the markets. Figure(4) below shows that 
except Dire Dawa and Gonder the average prices of markets are moving together throughout 
the period under consideration.  
 
 
Figure 4. Score Values of Wheat Markets from First Component Overtime 
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The results from the second component provide more explanation on why the wheat prices of 
the two markets (Dire Dawa and Gonder) differ from the others. The second principal 
component helps us in categorizing markets in terms of the magnitude of price variability, as 
it provides patterns of price variability across markets. Though we find that the average price 
across markets is nearly the same, the second component elucidates that price variability 
across markets is different. We deduce from the results that there is a negative price 
variability correlation between markets located within the 300 km radius of the central 
market, Addis Ababa, and those located outside the 300km radius, except Mekelle. That is, 
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price variability within the 300 km radius is lower than price variability outside this radius 
implying that the further markets are located from the capital, or the central market, the more 
variable wheat prices become.  Figure (5) provides the patterns of price variability over time. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Score Values of Wheat Market from Second Component Overtime 
-1
-.
5
0
.5
1
S
e
cc
on
d 
C
o
m
po
ne
nt
 S
co
re
2001m7 2004m1 2006m7 2009m1 2011m7
Year/Month
AA Ambo Assela DD Dessie
Gonder Jimma Mekelle Nazeeth Robe
Shash
Score Values from Second Component Over time
 
 
PCA on Monthly Price Changes 
 
To demonstrate the short run dynamics of the price movements across the markets, the PCA 
has been conducted on the monthly changes of the wheat price.  
The PCA conducted on the monthly changes of the prices of wheat at different markets 
reveals that in the short run the average monthly change in the prices of wheat categorizes the 
markets under investigation into two blocks: Group 1- Ambo, Dire Dawa, Dessie, Gonder, 
and Nazereth; Group 2-Addis Ababa, Assela, Jimma, Mekelle, Robe, and Shashemene. In 
Group 1 we observe that the average monthly changes are less than Group 2.  
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Figure 6. Score Values of  Wheat Price Monthly Changes From First Component Overtime 
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From the second score value we observe that the price variability in the short run is the 
highest in Ambo, Dire Dawa, and Dessie.  
 
 
Figure 7. Score Values of Wheat Price Monthly Changes from Second Component Overtime 
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4.4.2 Maize Market  
 
For the analysis of the maize market, we look into the maize prices of 10 local markets 
namely: Addis Ababa, Ambo, Dire Dawa, Dessie, Gonder, Jimma, Mekelle, Nazereth, 
Nekemete, and Shashemene. As for the case in the wheat market, Addis Ababa is considered 
the central maize market and all other local market prices compare against the Addis Ababa 
maize price.  
The summary statistics provided in table (7) indicate that nominal prices have increased 
substantially between July 2001 and December 2011. The increase in Addis Ababa, Ambo, 
Jimma, Nekemte, and Shashemene happened to be above the increase in the national price 
level. In contrast, the Dire Dawa and Mekelle prices changed below the national average. As  
these two markets are deficit markets some kind of price stabilization intervention may have 
been introduced so that prices don`t change as large as the other markets. The real prices, on 
the other hand, have fallen in all markets except Nekemte. The percentage range of nominal 
prices also shows that price spikes are relatively low in the deficit markets compared with the 
central market and markets considered as surplus markets. However, when it comes to real 
prices the story is different, as we observe that even price stabilization interventions, if any, 
would not be able to effectively stabilize the market. Markets that appear to be benefiting 
from some form of price stabilization have not consistently reflect it in the real price series. 
For instance, the percentage range of real price in the Dire Dawa market exceeds the national 
percentage range  by 50%  showing that unlike its nominal counterpart real price in Dire 
Dawa has shown larger price spikes, yet below some of the markets located proximate to the 
central market.  
 
With regard to price variability, the standard deviation of monthly changes shows that the 
nominal price variability has not shown a difference of more than one percentage point across 
markets including the national price, with the exception of  Jimma, Nekemete, and Nazereth, 
which have, 12%, 13%, and 14%  nominal price variability,  respectively. The variability in 
the real prices appeared to be higher than the variability in the national price level in 6 of the 
11 markets, the highest being in Nazereth. The two deficit markets, Dire Dawa and Mekelle, 
have higher average prices than the other markets. 
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Table 7. Summary Statistics of Nominal and Real Prices of Maize in 10 Markets 
Markets 
Percentage change  
July 2001 to December 2011 
Percentage Range over 
the same period 
Standard deviations of 
monthly changes 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
  Nominal  Real Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal  Real Nominal Real 
AA 309% -13% 954% 383% 10% 30% 20.28 14.43 3764% 461% 
Ambo 328% -9% 1151% 438% 10% 32% 19.16 13.49 3763% 457% 
DD 22% -74% 541% 429% 11% 35% 25.27 19.19 3874% 757% 
Dessie 212% -33% 824% 375% 10% 29% 21.13 15.16 3776% 465% 
Gonder 235% -28% 801% 329% 9% 29% 21.26 15.32 3607% 467% 
Jimma 387% 4% 1358% 460% 12% 36% 18.22 12.73 3782% 462% 
Mekelle 177% -41% 690% 344% 9% 28% 23.38 17.08 3749% 495% 
Nazereth 209% -34% 940% 366% 14% 45% 19.81 14.11 3600% 433% 
Nekemete 443% 16% 1563% 495% 13% 39% 17.47 12.09 3775% 459% 
Shash 313% -12% 1076% 403% 11% 35% 19.45 13.73 3745% 454% 
National 259% -23% 925% 379% 10% 30% 20.08 14.26 3730% 451% 
 
 
The overall price variability provided by the standard deviation of the price series over the 
entire period indicate that maize prices are more variable in Dire Dawa than any other 
market.  In most markets, the nominal maize price variability is above the variability in the 
national nominal price, the exceptions are Nazereth and Gonder. Nazereth also has 
demonstrated the lowest variability in real prices, which is below the national real price 
variability.  
As indicated in table (8) we retained only two principal components, since the first two 
principal components explain 98% of the variation in the price data of the 10 local maize 
markets. The first principal component sheds light on the pattern of average maize price 
across the 10 local markets. It shows that average maize prices move together across 9 of the 
10 markets studied, except Dire Dawa. Because, Dire Dawa market is categorized as deficit 
market and located far from the central market at a distance of over 600 kms. Unlike Dire 
Dawa, markets such as Gonder and Mekelle both located at a distance of 600 and 783 kms, 
respectively, have average maize prices equivalent to the average price of other markets. This 
implies that the distance barrier as an obstacle to market integration has been overcome 
following the infrastructure developments observed in the areas where these markets are 
located.  
The second component, on the other hand, hints the extent of price variability in the deficit 
and surplus markets. It projects into Dire Dawa and Mekelle and compares their price 
variability to the other markets. As it can be seen from the score values of the second 
component depicted in figure(9), prices are more variable in Dire Dawa than any other 
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market, followed by  Mekelle. Thus from the results we observe that improving market 
infrastructure would help in making prices less unpredictable across regions in the country. 
This is because of the fact that in integrated markets shocks in one market will instantly 
transmit to the other market and impact the other market either proportionately or less 
proportionately depending on the extent of integration. For this reason, within a certain time 
period markets adjust to nearly the same level of average prices, resulting in one national 
price.   
  
Table 8. PCA Results of Maize Market 
Variables Comp1 Comp2 
AA 0.3352 -0.0375 
Ambo 0.3332 -0.1037 
DD 0.1344 0.9577 
Dessie 0.3344 0.0373 
Gonder 0.3246 -0.0528 
Jimma 0.3302 -0.1366 
Mekelle 0.3253 0.1222 
Nazereth 0.3297 0.0137 
Nekemete 0.3266 -0.1699 
Shash 0.3333 -0.0618 
Eigenvalue 8.8652 0.9098 
Proportion 
Explained  0.8865 0.0910 
Cumulative 
Variation  0.8865 0.9775 
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Figure 8. Score Values of Maize Markets from First Component Overtime 
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Figure 9. Score Values of Maize Markets from Second Component Overtime 
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PCA on Monthly Price Changes 
 
The PCA employed on monthly price changes, as discussed in section 4.3, implies the co-
movement of prices in different markets in the short run. As can be seen from Figure 10, the 
prices in all markets follow a similar trend in the short run, except Dire Dawa. Thus, those 
markets known as deficit markets in maize production such as Mekelle, Gonder, and Dessie 
have shown improvement overtime following the development of market infrastructure. 
However, Dire Dawa, despite such developments remained an isolated deficit market 
characterized by price trends moving contrary to the markets under consideration.  
 
 
Figure 10. Score Value of Wheat Price Monthly Changes from First Component Overtime 
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With regard to the variability of the monthly price changes across markets, the second 
component of the PCA on monthly price changes reveals that the prices are more variable in 
the short run in Dire Dawa followed by Nazereth and Shashemene.  
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Figure 11. Score Value of Maize Monthly Price Changes from Second Component Overtime 
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4.5. Price Spreads 
 
As an exposition to the long run tendency of the integration of local markets, in this part we 
discuss the pattern of price spreads between the central market, Addis Ababa, and other local 
markets of wheat and maize.  
Negative values of average price spreads show that prices in Addis Ababa are lower than the 
corresponding local markets and vice versa. In the wheat market the highest average price 
spreads occurred in Ambo and Mekelle, where real wheat prices were below the Addis Ababa 
price by $5.16 and $4.88 per ton, respectively (see table 9 below). In markets such as Dire 
Dawa, Gonder and Dessie wheat prices have been on average above the Addis Ababa price 
by the amount $2.14, $1.06, and $0.88 per ton, respectively. Two points emerge from these 
results. First, even if Ambo is the market closest to Addis Ababa, the real wheat price 
difference between the two markets happen to be larger on average. However, the price 
spreads have declined over time (see appendix B1). The reason for such price difference may 
have been due to the intervention of intermediate market brokers who might have distorted 
market information despite the closeness of the market to the centre. Thus, the structure of 
the market organization by itself plays a significant role in price determination and 
transmission of price signals between markets. Second, in contrast to its wheat production 
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status and distance from the central market,  the Mekelle market has exhibited higher positive 
price spread on average implying that real wheat prices in Mekelle have been lower than the 
central market over the period under consideration. This might be due to the food aid releases 
to the area and the subsequent effect of such intervention on market prices. 
The stationarity test of price spreads (last column of table 9) from the central market for all 
markets shows that in the long run the price differences across markets tend to die out 
indicating that the integration of  local markets has been improving through time.  
 
 
Table 9. Price Spreads between the central market and other markets of Wheat from  
July 2001 to December 2011 
Markets 
Average Price 
Spread 
Standard 
Deviation of  
Price Spreads 
Distance 
(in Km) 
are Spreads 
Stationary?  
Ambo 5.16 1249% 125 Yes 
Assela 2.21 483% 175 Yes 
DD -2.14 866% 515 Yes 
Dessie -0.88 452% 401 Yes 
Gonder -1.06 1240% 725 Yes 
Jimma 0.45 247% 346 Yes 
Mekelle 4.88 798% 783 Yes 
Nazereth 1.82 686% 98 Yes 
Robe 0.51 218% 430 Yes 
Shash 0.51 218% 251 Yes 
 
With regard to maize market, the price spreads as reported in table (10) indicate that markets 
further from the central market have the highest average price spreads, or in other words, the 
real maize price that prevail in the central market has been lower than other local markets 
located in a distance of more than 400 kms, with the exception of Nekemte.  The maize 
market of Nekemte appears to be relatively less integrated to the central market. However, 
the graphical illustration of the price spreads indicates that price spreads between Nekemte 
and the central market has been declining owing to the development of infrastructure 
connecting the two market sites. Likewise, the Mekelle maize market also appears to be 
weakly integrated into the central market; but it has shown improvement over time.   
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Table 10. Price Spreads between the central market and other markets of Maize from  
July 2001 to December 2011 
Markets 
Average  
Price Spread 
Standard Deviation  
of Spreads 
Distance 
Is Price Spread  
Stationary? 
Ambo 0.94 1.64 125 Yes 
DD -4.76 25.22 515 Yes 
Dessie -0.73 1.77 401 Yes 
Gonder -0.89 4.45 725 Yes 
Jimma 1.70 2.65 346 Yes 
Mekelle -2.65 4.74 783 Yes? 
Nazereth 0.32 3.38 98 Yes 
Nekemete 2.33 3.52 430 No? 
Shash 0.69 1.71 251 Yes 
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Summary of Results of Intra-Regional Market Integration 
 
Wheat Market 
 Nominal wheat prices increased substantially in all markets. The increase in most of 
the markets, except Dire Dawa, Dessie, and Jimma, was well above the increase in the 
national prices. 
 The real prices of wheat have fallen in all markets over the period from July 2001 to 
December 2011;howeer, Ambo exceptionally has shown an increase of about 60 per 
cent.  
 Price variability in Ambo, Dire Dawa,  Gonder and Nazereth appeared to be more 
than twice as large as the variability in other wheat markets. However, the average 
price over the entire period across markets has not shown substantial difference. 
 Results from PCA of the wheat market show that except Dire Dawa and Gonder, 
average wheat prices across markets are moving together over the entire period under 
consideration. 
 Further, we observe that there is a negative price variability correlation between 
markets located within the 300 Km radius of the central market , Addis Ababa, and 
those located outside the 300 Km radius, with the exception of Mekelle. This implies 
that the further markets are located from the capital, or the central market, the more 
variable wheat prices become.  
 With regard to the short run characterization of the wheat market, wheat prices in 
Ambo, Dire Dawa, Dessie, and Nazereth tend to move together whereas prices in 
Addis Ababa, Assela, Jimma, Mekelle, Robe, and Shashemene move together. The 
short run price variability tends to be the highest in Ambo, Dire Dawa, and Dessie. 
Maize Market 
 
 Nominal prices of maize have increased substantially across markets between July 
2001 and December 2011. The increase observed in Addis Ababa, Ambo, Jimma, 
Nekemte, and Shashemene happened to be above the increase in the national price 
level. In contrast, the Dire Dawa and Mekelle prices changed below the national 
average.  
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 The real prices of maize, on the other hand, have fallen in all markets except 
Nekemte. price spikes in maize market appear to be low in the deficit markets 
compared to the central market and markets considered as surplus markets. 
 The nominal price variability has not shown a difference of more than one percentage 
point across markets including the national price, with the exception of Jimma, 
Nekemte and Nazereth, which have 12%, 13%, and 14% nominal price variability, 
respectively.  
 The overall price variability provided by the standard deviation of the price series 
over the entire period indicate that maize prices are more variable in Dire Dawa than 
any other  markets.  
 The PCA results also show that the average maize prices move together in 9 out of the 
10 markets studied with the exception of Dire Dawa. 
 Unlike Dire Dawa, markets such as Gonder and Mekelle located at a distance of 600 
Kms and 700Kms, respectively, have shown average maize prices equivalent to the 
average price of other markets. This implies that the distance barrier as an obstacle to 
market integration has been overcome following the national infrastructure 
developments. 
 Maize prices appear to be more variable in Dire Dawa, followed by Mekelle. 
 With regard to the short run price dynamics, maize price in all markets demonstrated 
a similar trend, except Dire Dawa. The short run price variability happened to be more 
in Dire Dawa followed by Nazereth and Shashemene.   
Price Spreads 
 
 In the wheat market the highest average price spreads occurred in Ambo and Mekelle, 
where real prices of wheat were below the Addis Ababa price by $5.16, and $4.88 per 
ton, respectively. 
 Looking the price spreads between the central market and other markets we observe 
that even if Ambo is the market closest t the central market, the  difference in the real 
prices of wheat between the two markets happen to be larger on average, but the 
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spreads have been declining over time. On the other hand, Mekelle has exhibited 
higher positive price spread on average implying that real prices of wheat in Mekelle 
have been lower th the central market in the period under consideration. 
 The stationarity test of the price spreads from the central market for all markets shows 
that in the long run the price differences across markets tend to die out indicating that 
the integration of local markets has been improving. 
 The price spreads of the maize market reveal that the real price of maize that prevail 
in the central market has been lower than other local markets located at a distance of 
more than 400 Kms, with the exception of Nekemte.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
After the 2007/08 global food price increases, the global concern has shifted towards 
understanding the food price dynamics and its volatility so that such an understanding helps 
in designing policy responses. Particularly, the increased food prices posed significant 
challenges for developing countries where households spend a larger share of their income on 
food. To this end, studying how the domestic markets are linked to the world market and the 
extent of the pass through of the increased food prices to domestic markets is indispensable.  
Various studies have shown that transmission of food price shocks to domestic markets 
depends on the importance of the commodity in the country`s food staple, food status of the 
country, domestic factors, and policies. These factors come together in many different ways 
to limit the pass through of global food price inflation to domestic markets.  
In this study we addressed two issues. Firstly, we have shown that the domestic grain market 
prices, though thought to be structurally isolated, appeared to be integrated to the 
international grain market. This has been demonstrated using two exchange market prices for 
each commodity against which we analyze the integration of Ethiopian grain market to the 
world market. That is, we used US maize and SAFEX maize prices as maize exchange 
market prices and examined the relationship with the Ethiopian maize market. For wheat, we 
used Paris milling wheat and Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) soft wheat prices as exchange 
market prices and investigated the relationship of them with the Ethiopian wheat market.  
We found out that the Ethiopian whet market is integrated into the world market as evidenced 
by its cointegration with the Paris wheat market. However,  the cointegration happened to be 
uni-directional as only Paris wheat market reacts to the price developments in Ethiopia. No 
cointegration is observed between Ethiopian wheat market and Chicago exchange wheat 
market. This implies that the Ethiopian wheat market is integrated to the international wheat 
market which are geographically closer to it. This is evidenced by the fact that Ethiopia 
imports most of its wheat from the Black sea and Mediterranean ports, for it requires lower  
transportation cost and the wheat imported through these ports is purchased with lower price 
at the exchange markets located in Europe.   
With regard to maize, the Ethiopian maize market is found to be integrated into the world 
market. As it is the case for wheat, geographically the nearest exchange market (SAFEX) 
appeared to be cointegrated with the Ethiopian maize market. While the US maize market 
does show no cointegration.  However, the results must be taken with caution as the no-
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cointegration relation does not necessarily guarantee that there is no price pass through 
between any two markets investigated. Therefore, it might be helpful to further investigate a 
regime switching cointegration model to see whether the co-integrations observed are due to 
some form of policy interventions.   
 
 
In the study further we examined domestic market price integration. The Ethiopian grain 
market have been under the influence of policy changes that resulted from the changes in 
governments and hence their ideologies towards the functioning of the market. In the post 
1991 period, though not full-fledged, the grain market in Ethiopia has shown improvement.  
This is mainly attributable to the developments in infrastructure such as road networking and 
telephone service expansion.  
Nonetheless despite such developments, we observe that in the domestic wheat market price 
variability appears to be higher in the markets located in a distance outside the 300Km radius 
of the central market. The exception in this regard is Mekelle, which has been categorized as 
deficit market.  With regard to the short run characterization of the wheat market, wheat 
prices in Ambo, Dire Dawa, Dessie, and Nazereth tend to move together whereas prices in 
Addis Ababa, Assela, Jimma, Mekelle, Robe, and Shashemene move together. The short run 
price variability tends to be the highest in Ambo, Dire Dawa, and Dessie.  
In the maize market analysis we found that Gonder and Mekelle located at a distance of 600 
Kms and 700Kms, respectively, have shown average maize prices equivalent to the average 
price of other markets. This implies that the distance barrier as an obstacle to market 
integration has been overcome following the national infrastructure developments. 
The price spreads between the central market and other markets have shown that over time 
the price differences is declining. But we observe that even if Ambo is the market closest to 
the central market, the  difference in the real prices of wheat between the two markets happen 
to be larger on average, but the spreads have been declining over time. On the other hand, 
Mekelle has exhibited higher positive price spread on average implying that real prices of 
wheat in Mekelle have been lower than the central market in the period under consideration. 
These mixed result imply that full integration of the domestic market is an objective hat is not 
yet achieved. Thus further intensification of the investment in market infrastructure and 
development of market institutions is essential so that the differences in prices and hence the 
price volatility across domestic markets could be reduced.  
 
44 
 
References 
 
Abdulai, A., 2000. Spatial price transmission and asymmetry in the Ghanaian maize 
market. J. Dev. Econ. 63, 327–349. 
 
Ardeni, P. G. (1989). Does the Law of One price Really Hold for Commodity Prices? 
American Journal  of Agricultural Economics 71: 661-669. 
 
Baffes, J. and B. Gardner. 2003. The Transmission of World Commodity Prices to 
Domestic Markets under Policy Reforms in Developing Countries.” Journal of Policy 
Reform. 6. 159-180. 
 
Conforti, P. 2004. Price Transmission in Selected Agricultural Markets. FAO 
Commodity and Trade Policy Research Working Paper No. 7. Food and Agriculture 
Organization. 
 
Dawe, D. 2008. Have Recent Increases in International Cereal Prices Been 
Transmitted to Domestic Economies?: The Experience in Seven Large Asian 
Countries. ESA Working Paper No. 08-03. Development Economics Divisions, Food 
and Agriculture Organization. 
 
Dercon, Stefan, 1994. “Food Markets, Liberalization and Peace in Ethiopia: An 
Econometrics Analysis,” Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford. 
 
Engle, R.F. and Granger, C.W.J. (1987). Cointegration and Error Correction: 
Representation, Estimation and Testing. Econometrica 55: 251-276.  
 
Fackler, P.L., and B.K. Goodwin. 2001. Spatial price transmission. In Handbook of 
Agricultural Economics, (ed.) B. Gardner and G. Rausser. Volume 1, Chapter 17. 
Elsevier Science. 
 
Franzel, S., F. Colburn, and G. Degu. 1989. Grain marketing regulations: Impact on 
peasant production in Ethiopia. Food Policy14: 347-358. 
 
Gardner, B.L. & Brooks, K.M., 1994.Food prices and market integration in Russia: 
1992-93. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 76, 641-646. 
 
Gilbert, C. L. and C. W. Morgan. 2010. Food Price Volatility. Philosophical 
Transactions of  the Royal Society. 365, 1554: 3023-3034. 
 
Gilbert, C.L. 2011. Grain Price Pass,Through,2005,2009. In: Prakash, A. (ed.), 
Safeguarding Food Security in Volatile Global Markets. Rome, FAO.  
 
45 
 
Hazell, P. et al. 1990. The relationship between world price instability and the prices 
farmers receive in developing countries, Journal of Agricultural Economics, 41: 227-
243 
 
Holmbeg, J. 1977. Grain Marketing and Land Reform in Ethiopia: An Analysis of the 
Marketing and Pricing of Food Grains in 1976 after the Land Reform. Research 
Report 41. The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. 
 
Ianchovichina, E., J. Loening, and C. Wood. 2012. How Vulnerable Are Arab 
Countries to Global Food Price Shocks. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper  
6018. Washington D.C. 
 
Imai, K., R. Gaiha, and G. Thapa. 2008. Transmission of World Commodity Prices to   
Domestic Commodity Prices in India and China. Brook World Poverty Institute 
(BWPI) Working Paper No. 45.Manchester.  
 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2011. “Target What You Can Hit: Commodity 
Price Swings and Monetary Policy” in World Economic Outlook September 2011. 
IMF: Washington D.C. 
 
Isard, P. 1977. How far can we push the ‘law of one price’?, American Economic 
Review, 67, pp. 942–948. 
 
Johansen, S. 1988. Statistical analysis of cointegrating vectors. Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control 12: 231-254. 
 
Keats, S., S. Wiggins, J. Compton, and M. Vigneri. 2010. Food Price Transmission: 
Rising International Cereals Prices and Domestic Markets. Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI) Project Briefing No. 48.ODI: London.  
 
Lirenso, A. 1994. Liberalizing Ethiopian Grain Markets. In Papers of the 12th 
International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, ed. H. Marcus, and G. Hudson. East 
Lansing: Michigan State University. 
 
Lirenso, A. 1995. “Grain Market Reform and Food Security in Ethiopia,” paper 
presented at the World Bank Seminar, Washington, D.C., June 15, 1995. 
 
Mendoza, M.S., and M.W. Rosegrant 1995a. Pricing Behavior in Philippine corn 
markets: Implications for market efficiency, Research Report  101. International Food 
Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC. 
 
Minot, N. 2011. Transmission of World Food Price Changes to Markets in sub-
Saharan Africa. International Food Policy Research Institute, Discussion Paper 
1059.Washington D.C. 
46 
 
 
Monke, E., and T. Petzel. 1984. Market integration: An application to international 
trade in cotton, American Journal of  Agricultural Economics 66:481-487. 
 
Morisset, J. 1998.Unfair trade? The increasing gap between world and domestic 
prices in commodity markets during the past 25 years. The World Bank Economic 
Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, 503-26. 
 
Mundlak, Y. and D. Larson. 1992. On the Transmission of World Agriculture Prices. 
World Bank Economic Review. 6, 3: 399-422. 
 
Negassa, A. and R. Myers, 2007. Estimating Policy Effects on Spatial Market 
Efficiency: An Extension to the Parity Bound Model. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 89 (2): 338-352. 
 
Quiroz, J. and Soto, R. 1993. International price signals in agricultural markets: do 
governments care?, mimeo, The World Bank, October 
 
Quiroz, J. and R. Soto. 1995. International Price Signals in  Agricultural Markets: Do 
Governments Care? World Bank Mimeo. 
 
Rapsomanikis, G., D. Hallam, and P. Conforti. 2004. “Market Integration and Price 
Transmission in Selected Food and Cash Crop Markets of Developing Countries: 
Review and Applications.” in Commodity Market Review 2003-2004. Food and 
Agriculture Organization: Rome. 
 
Rashid, S. 2004. “Spatial Integration of Maize Markets in Post-Liberalized Uganda.” 
Journal of African Economies 13 (1): 103–133. 
 
Rashid, S., and S. Lemma. 2010. Strategic Grain Reserve in Ethiopia: Institutional 
Design and Operational Performance. International Food Policy Research Institute, 
Discussion Paper 1054. Washington, D.C. 
 
Rashid, S. 2011. Inter-commodity Price Transmission and Food Price Policies: An 
Analysis of Ethiopian Cereals Markets. IFPRI Discussion paper 1079. Washington, 
D.C.:  International Food Policy Research Institute. 
 
Ravallion, M., 1986. Testing market integration, American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 68(2), 292-307. 
 
Timmer, C. P. 2008. Causes of High Food Prices. ADB Economics Working Paper 
Series No. 128.ADB: Manila.   
 
47 
 
Van Campenhout, B., 2007. Modelling trends in food market integration: Method and 
an application to Tanzanian maize markets. Food Policy  33 (1), 112–127. 
 
World Food Program (WFP). 1989. Mid-term Evaluation by a WFP/FAO/ILO/UN 
Mission of Project Ethiopia 2488/(Exp. II): Rehabilitation of Forest, Grazing, and 
Agricultural Lands, Vol. 1. Addis Ababa: World Food Program. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
Appendix A 
 
Missing Value Imputation Technique 
  
The missing values of the price series of the local markets have been  interpolated using the 
following technique after (Gilbert,  2011).  
Let the price of a commodity in market m  and month  t  be mtp , ( 1,...., ; 1,...., )m n t T  . 
The set of months for which mtp  is observed for a market m is denoted by mS . To estimate 
the missing prices suppose  
ln lnmt t mt mtp       
Where t  is the (unobserved) representative national price in month t , m is the average 
market m differential relative to the national average and mt is a random error. Given 
estimates ˆt  and 
ˆ
mt , a missing price, mtp , can be estimated as  
 ˆˆ ˆln lnmt t mt mp t S      
The procedure implemented in this paper is as follows: 
I. For the price series where we have at least one price observation for a month t , we 
estimate t as a median of the observed prices.  Here we use median instead of the 
average since the median will be less affected by the pattern of missing observations 
and the presence of high and low price markets.  
II. If no prices are reported for a particular month t , which rarely happens, we 
interpolate the national price of that particular month as 1 1 12ˆ ˆ ˆln [ln ln ]t t t     . We 
have not faced this problem in this study, however.  
III. Then we estimate the differentials ˆln ln ( )mt mt t mp t S    . Suppose the 
differentials are AR(1), , 1mt m m m t mt        . We estimate the parameters of this 
AR(1) by OLS over mS , this allows interpolation of mt  as  
, 1
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
mt m m m t      , in the case that 1 mt S   and , 1
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
mt m m m t      , otherwise. 
The national prices of all food crops considered in this paper are medians of the local 
market prices for the missing values of any particular month has been interpolated using the 
above technique.  
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Appendix B 
 
1. Wheat Market Price Spreads Overtime 
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2. Maize Market Price Spreads overtime 
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Appendix C 
 
Table 11.  Results of  Wheat Market Principal Components Analysis (Principal 
Components) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12. Eigenvectors of the first four Wheat Market Principal Components 
 
Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4  Unexplained 
AA 0.3139 -0.0573 -0.0584 0.0404 0.0186 
Ambo 0.3084 -0.2496 0.2712 0.5746 0.0031 
Assela 0.3090 -0.2436 -0.1466 -0.1674 0.0213 
DD 0.2852 0.4302 -0.1824 0.4130 0.0678 
Dessie 0.3023 0.2017 -0.0870 0.1209 0.0541 
Gonder 0.3057 0.0397 0.9011 -0.1457 0.0010 
Jimma 0.2492 0.6723 -0.0683 -0.0180 0.0091 
Mekelle 0.3165 -0.0386 -0.0550 -0.4358 0.0352 
Nazereth 0.2906 -0.4088 -0.0750 -0.4527 0.0664 
Robe 0.3126 -0.1605 -0.0972 -0.0246 0.0049 
Shash 0.3166 -0.0377 -0.0972 -0.0246 0.0049 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Principal Components Number of observations 126 
(Components/Correlation) Number of components 4 
  
Trace 
 
11 
Rotation: Unrotated Principal Rho 
 
0.9871 
     
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 9.9264 9.2258 0.9024 0.9024 
Comp2 0.7006 0.5569 0.0637 0.9661 
Comp3 0.1437 0.0568 0.0131 0.9792 
Comp4 0.0869 0.0270 0.0079 0.9871 
Comp5 0.0598 0.0180 0.0054 0.9925 
Comp6 0.0419 0.0273 0.0038 0.9963 
Comp7 0.0146 0.0033 0.0013 0.9976 
Comp8 0.0113 0.0015 0.0010 0.9987 
Comp9 0.0098 0.0050 0.0009 0.9995 
Comp10 0.0047 0.0044 0.0004 1.0000 
Comp11 0.0003   0.0000 1.0000 
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Table 13.  Results of  Maize Market Principal Components Analysis (Principal 
Components) 
Principal components   Number of observations 126 
(Components/Correlation) Number of Components 4 
   
Trace 10 
Rotation: Unrotated: Principal  Rho 0.9954 
     
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Comp1 8.8652 7.9554 0.8865 0.8865 
Comp2 0.9098 0.7799 0.0910 0.9775 
Comp3 0.1299 0.0810 0.0130 0.9905 
Comp4 0.0489 0.0262 0.0049 0.9954 
Comp5 0.0227 0.0149 0.0023 0.9977 
Comp6 0.0079 0.0019 0.0008 0.9984 
Comp7 0.0060 0.0005 0.0006 0.9990 
Comp8 0.0055 0.0026 0.0005 0.9996 
Comp9 0.0028 0.0016 0.0003 0.9999 
Comp10 0.0012 . 0.0001 1.0000 
 
Table 14. Eigenvectors of the first four Maize Market Principal Components 
Variables Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Unexplained 
AA 0.3352 -0.0375 0.0278 -0.0253 0.0025 
Ambo 0.3332 -0.1037 0.1397 0.1338 0.0026 
DD 0.1344 0.9577 0.1727 0.1670 0.0001 
Dessie 0.3344 0.0373 -0.0703 -0.1410 0.0056 
Gonder 0.3246 -0.0528 -0.6063 0.4172 0.0069 
Jimma 0.3302 -0.1366 0.2889 0.1616 0.0042 
Mekelle 0.3253 0.1222 -0.5532 -0.2073 0.0065 
Nazereth 0.3297 0.0137 0.1339 -0.7355 0.0074 
Nekemete 0.3266 -0.1699 0.3695 0.3839 0.0034 
Shash 0.3333 -0.0618 0.1829 -0.0469 0.0070 
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Appendix D 
1. Map of Wheat Markets  
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2. Map of Maize Markets 
 
 
